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The opinion of the court of appeals (A. 81) is reported 
at 549 F.2d 1064. The opinion of the district court (A. 31) 
is reported at 419 F. Supp. 753 . 
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JURISDICTION 
f A peals was entered on The judgment of the Court 0 p.. 't of 
1977 (A 97). The petitIOn for a wn 
January 31, . . M 31 1977 and granted on 
certiorabri w
1
a
4
s 1f91~~d(:n566)~YThe 'jurisdiction of this Court 
Novem er, . 
rests on 28 U.S .c. 1254(1). 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
E d ed Species Act of 1 Whether Section 7 of the n anger f 
. .' f n for a component 0 an 1973 contains an ImplIed exemp 10 
ongoing federal project: 
h the Act took effect and the 
a .) Where, w en . 1 a small 
d ed species was dIscovered, on Y en anger . h d occurred 
f tion of project expendItures a ' 
ra.c .' h of farmlands and road and pnmanly In purc ase 
bridge improvements; and 
So as to excuse an agency from !ull ~~~sultation with regard to pro~ect modificatIOns 
for protection of endangered speCIes. 
2 Whether the Endangered Species Act was imp~ietdlYt 
. . f ns where no m en d d b subsequent appropna 10 , 
amen e Yd' the bills or legislative history. 
to amend was expresse In 
STATUTE INVOLVED 
ction 7 of the Endangered Species A.ct of 1~73, 87 St~t. 
Se (S V) 1536 provides In pertinent part. 892, 16 U .s.c. upp . , 
INTERAGENCY COOPERATION 
. . All. . . Federal departments and agen~ies_ shall, 
. . 'th and with the aSSIStance of in consultatIOn WI 
3 
the Secretary, utilize their authorities in 
furtherance of the purposes of this Act by carrying 
out programs for the conservation of endangered 
species ... and by taking such action necessary to 
insure that actions authorized, funded or carried 
out by them do not jeopardize the continued 
existence of such endangered species ... or result 
in the destruction or modification of habitat of 
such species which is determined by the Secretary, 
after consultation as appropriate with the affected 
States, to be critical. 
STATEMENT 
The Little Tennessee River arises in the mountains of 
northern Georgia, and flows through the national forest 
lands of North Carolina into Tennessee, where it joins the 
Big Tennessee near Knoxville. The valley'S last undammed 
stretch adjOins the Great Smoky Mountains National Park 
in Tennessee, and comprises 33 river miles of fertile 
farmland, forests, and clear cool flowing waters . The 
Tennessee Valley Authority has acquired th is valley land 
for its 38,000-acre Tellico economic development project . 
This case involves one component of that project, a dam 
which would impound 16,500 acres of the project area. 
As the district court noted in an earlier Tellico 
litigation: 
[The] free-flowing stretch of the Little Tennessee 
River as it exists in its present natural state . . . is 
acknowledged to be the largest and best trout 
fishing water east of the Mississippi River. On the 
south bank of the Little Tennessee is Fort Loudon, 
built in 1756 as England's southwestern outpost in 
the French and Indian War. The river bottomlands 
also contain several village sites of the Cherokee 
Indian Nation that have considerable archeological 
significance . They include Chota, the ancient 
4 
capital of the Cherokees, Tuskeegee, the birthplace 
of Sequoyah, and Tenassee, from which Tennessee 
derives its name. These archeological stores are 
virtually untapped . The free-flowing river is the 
likely habitat of one or more of seven rare or 
endangered fish species . The winding, free-flowing 
Little Tennessee River lies in a picturesque, 
pastoral setting untouched by urban and industrial 
blight and pollution. The evidence shows that all of 
these benefits of the present Little Tennessee River 
Valley will be destroyed by impoundment of the 
river ... as will some of the most valuable and 
productive farm land in East Tennessee. 
[Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 
hereafter EDF v. TVA, 339 F. Supp. 806, 808 (E.D . Tenn. 
1972).)1 After the construction of 68 dams throughout the 
Tennessee Valley, (22 within 60 miles of Tellico) the 
Tellico area is the last such high quality stretch remaining 
in the region, and the last habitat of the endangered 
species here concerned, the snail darter Percina Imostoma 
tanasi. 
The Tellico Project. The Tellico Project is a multipurpose 
regional development project, authorized by TVA and 
funded by Congressional appropriations beginning in 
1966. 2 
1 Since the present case was litigated as an enforcement action, 
leaving economic and policy analysis to the Congressional forum, much 
of the project information here is drawn from prior Tellico litigation 
and from subsequent Congressional materials (Hearings before a 
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public 
Works, 95th Cong ., 1st Sess., July 1977, chaired by Senator John Culver 
(hereafter "1977 Culver Hearings"); Comptroller-General (General 
Accounting Office) Report EMD-77-58, "The TVA Tellico Project -
Costs, Alternatives and Benefits" (hereafter "GAO Report"), submitted 
October 14, 1977. For textual clarity, most such authorities are cited in 
footnotes. 
2 TVA, unlike other agencies, is self-authorizing in its projects so 
that it can undertake such actions without specific Congressional 
authorization provided that funds are included in its yearly lump sum 
budget grant. Section 4(j), 27, Tennessee Valley Authority Act, 48 Stat. 
61, 71, 16 U.s.c. 831c(j) and 831z (1933). 
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The Tellico dam, the project component which has 
attracted the most public opposition over the years, was 
planned and justified as part of the project's regional 
development objective. The two primary benefits claimed 
for the impoundment were stimulation of shoreline 
development, and flat-water recreation. Traditional water 
project benefits were limited . There was no irrigation 
function, negligible water supply, and limited flood and 
navigation benefits.3 The dam has no electric generators, 
b u t to a degree could augment flows through a small canal 
to an adjacent impoundment's generators. 4 The p roject's 
claimed benefits have recently been the subject of a 
critical analysis by the General Accounting Office (infra, at 
14). 
The Tellico dam itself is a relatively small p ortion of the 
project . The concrete dam spillway cost approximately 
3 The project's benefit-cost ratio showed annual claimed benefits of 
$3.7 million in the following categories : 
Recreation 
Shorelands development 
Flood control 
Navigation 
Power 
Fish and wildlife 
Water supply 
Redevelopment 
Annual benefits 
$1,440,000 
710,000 
505,000 
400,000 
400,000 
220,000 
70,000 
15,000 
$3,760,000 
GAO Report at 28. The only claimed benefit that GAO found to be 
accurate was the last. GAO Report at 36; 1977 Culver Hearings at 973 . 
4 The canal flowage, on TVA' s figures, could produce 22 megawatts 
of power capacity. TVA's presen t system comprises 22,223 MW, and 
will have 47,798 MW on line in 1985. 1977 Senate H earings at 869 , 
872-73, from material supplied to witnesses by TVA. Tellico thus would 
add 0.0008 to present capacity and 0.00046 to 1985 capacity, using TVA 
fIgures. 
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$5 million including labor; the total project's present 
estimated cost is about $120 million, of which $103 million 
had been spent prior to the injunction. s The largest single 
category of project expenditure to date has been for roads 
bridges and other adjustments, closely followed by th~ 
cost of buying up the valley's lands through 
condemnation or purchase. 6 The proposed impoundment 
w~ul~ cover only 16,500 of 38,000 acres at peak, although 
thIS mcludes most of the valley's prime class agricultural 
lands. 7 The remaining 21,500 acres was to have been 
developed with the Boeing Corporation as a 
separately-subsidized "Timberlake New Town", with 
development of commercial, residential, and industrial 
areas to be resold at appreciated values. Timberlake 
provided the majority of Tellico's shoreline development 
benefit claims, and was effectively halted as a project in 
1974-1975 when Congress refused to appropriate further 
subsidies and Boeing Corporation withdrew, citing 
problems of economic infeasibility.8 
Prior Litigation And Public Opposition. The Tellico Project 
has encountered continued delay over the years, at the 
hands of Congress which initially refused to fund it, 
5 GAO Report at 5, 7. Earth dikes, constructed after 1973, cost about 
~17 million, primarily labor. Id. The small concrete spillway was poured 
m 1967; the dam would impound 70 feet of water at its foundation 
point. The presently appropriated budget for Tellico is $116 million 
with a present proposed budget expansion of $3 million, primarily for 
new Items. The GAO noted that the actual project budget was likely to 
exceed $120 million. GAO Report at 37. 
6 Land costs and roads and bridge improvements alone comprise 
60% of expenditures to date ($61.2 million). GAO Report at 6, 7. 
7 The valley contains 25,500 acres of prime class farm land. GAO 
Report at 25, 64. Like other TVA lakes, a Tellico impoundment would 
be "drawn down" for six months a year, creating an extensive mudflat 
sector and reducing surface area. 
S TVA Timberlake Environmental Impact Statement, (1974). The 
federal budget prepared in 1974 eliminated the funds requested for the 
Jomt venture, and Boeing withdrew shortly thereafter. (Knoxville 
Journal, March 6,1975, page 1.) 
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through internal agency postponements, and in protracted 
public opposition. Opposition to the project over the 
years has been centered on the dam portion of the project, 
and has emphasized the potential loss of the valley's land 
and flowing water resources . Noting the arguably 
marginal nature of the reservoir's functions, the public 
critics have urged development of nonimpoundment 
economic options for the project area. Governor Winfield 
Dunn of Tennessee officially requested the Authority to 
modify the project for such river-based development 
without the impoundment in 1971, but was rebuffed. 9 
When TVA declined the Governor's request, local citizens 
and national conservation groups went to court and 
successfully sought an injunction against the reservoir for 
violation of NEPA. EDF v. TVA, 339 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1972), affirmed 468 F.2d 1164 (C.A. 6, 1972). Other 
litigation challenged the Authority's condemnation of 
non-reservoir private farm lands for resale. U.S.A. ex reI. 
TVA v. Two Tracts of Land containing 146.4 Acres in Loudon 
County, Tennessee, et al., 532 F.2d 1083 (C.A. 6, 1976). The 
NEPA injunction remained in effect until late 1973. EDF v. 
TVA, 492 F.2d 466 (C.A. 6, 1973) . Since 1974, when it 
became apparent that the project with impoundment 
would extinguish the endangered species, public efforts 
have focused on other economic development options that 
are consistent with species preservation: development of 
the valley's 25,500 acres of farm land; the clear flowing 
river resource; tourist development of the valley's 
recreation lands, forts and Cherokee sites in conjunction 
with the National Park; industrial parks; and other 
river-based development . 10 
~ Request for halt to reservoir project, Governor Dunn to Chairman 
Wagner, December 7, 1971; Rejection of request, Chairman Wagner to 
Governor Dunn, December 17, 1971; in Tellico Environmental Impact 
Statemen t. at 1-3-42 to 1-3-51. 
I() GAO Report at 19-25. 
" 
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The Endangered Species Act. The present Endangered Species 
Act was proposed in 1972, intensively debated, and 
passed by Congress in 1973, pursuant to seven 
international conventions and treaties for the protection of 
species, and in recognition of severe and increasing 
threats to wildlife in the United States and abroad. 87 
Stat. 884, 16 U.S.c. (Supp. V) 1531 et seq. (1973). The Act 
included extensive provisions for listing and protecting 
endangered species. Section 7 of the Act made these 
protections mandatory upon federal agencies, replacing 
the discretionary federal provisions of the previous 
statute, 83 Stat. 275 (1969). Section 7 prohibits federal 
actions which -
jeopardize the continued existence of such 
endangered species . .. or result in the destruction 
... of [the critical] habitat of such species .. . . [87 
Stat. 892, 16 U.S.c. (Supp. V) 1536 (1973) .] 
The Congress expressed multiple purposes for the Act: 
Consideration of this need to protect endangered 
species goes beyond the aesthetic. In hearings 
before the Subcommittee on the Environment it 
was shown that many of these animals perform 
vital biological services to maintain a "balance of 
nature" within their environments. Also revealed 
was the need for biological diversity for scientific 
purposes. [Senate Report No. 93-307, 93d Cong., 
1st Sess. 2990 (1973).] 
From all evidence available to us, it appears that 
the pace of disappearance of species is accelerating. 
As we homogenize the habitats in which these 
plants and animals evolved ... we threaten their -
and our own - genetic heritage. From the most 
narrow possible point of view, it is in the best 
interests of mankind to minimize the losses of 
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genetic variations... . [O ]ne of the critical 
chemicals in the regulation of ovulation in humans 
was found in a common plant. Once discovered, 
and analyzed, humans could duplicate it 
synthetically, but had it never existed - or had it 
been driven out of existence before we knew its 
potentialities - we would never have tried to 
synthesize it in the first place ... Sheer self-interest . 
impels us to be cautious .... "- Our ability to 
destroy, or almost destroy, all intelligent life on the 
planet became apparent only in this generation. A 
certain humility, and a sense of urgency, seem 
indicated. [H.R. Rep. No . 93-412, 93rd Cong., 1st 
Sess . 4, 5 (1973).] 
Species protection is thus a utilitarian function . As 
Senator Cranston noted in a prior set of hearings, species 
can act as indicators of threatened habitat quality for 
humans as well : 
If we undertake measures that will insure the 
preservation of other life forms, we will also insure 
the survival of man. As we take steps to preserve 
the environment of endangered fish and wildlife in 
some livable form . . . we will in the process 
preserve at least some of our own environment in a 
condition where we and Our children can survive. 
[Hearings on Endangered Species Conservation Act 
of 1972 before a Subcommittee of the Senate 
Committee on Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1972) .] 
The act became effective on December 28, 1973 . 
The Endangered Species Litigation. TVA had notice as early 
as 1971 of the likelihood that the Tellico project area 
contained endangered species. EDF v. TVA, 339 F. Supp. 
at 808 . The facts underlying the present litigation came to 
light with the discovery of the snail darter in August, 1973 
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by Dr. David Etnier, a noted University of Tennessee 
ich thyologis t. Shortly thereafter TVA received notice of 
the discovery and itself began to collect individuals of the 
species. 1 I 
The snail darter, it developed, is a highly sensitive 
indicator of special habitat qualities which now remain 
extant only in the Little Tennessee River. The fish is 
streamlined in shape, adapted to life on the cobbled 
bottom of the Little Tennessee's flowing waters, and it 
requires a large, cool high-quality river flow over shallow 
shoals for its spawning habitat. 12 There does not appear 
to be any equivalent stretch of river remaining in the 
region. At one time the fish apparently was broadly 
distributed in the large flowing rivers of eastern 
Tennessee, prior to the construction of dams throughout 
the region. 13 Now the fish survives only in the river 
system's last such clean undammed stretch. 
As the trial court later noted, the scientific community 
had never before known this fish, it was highly adapted 
,\1.' ~A.255. By November 1973, Dr. Etnier's work in the project area 
/)0,. ......... had led to a proposal for research funded by TVA . A. 112-113.,239-241 . 
12 A. 21-22, 108, 113-114. The fish relies upon small rIver sna~ls 
(also dependent on flowing river conditions) for a primary part of Its 
diet, hence the species' popular name "snail darter." Exhibit 12 at tnal, 
a detailed prin t depicting the fish and its habitat, has been deposIted 
with the Clerk. 
13 The snail darter's prior range probably extended throu~hout the 
upper main Tennessee River and the lower reaches of ItS major 
tributaries above Chattanooga - the Hiwassee, LIttle Tennessee, 
Clinch Holston and French Broad Rivers, all now covered by succes~ions of i:npoundments. See map from 1977 Senate Hearings, 
Appendix A, infra. Testimony of TVA Witness at heanngs on t~e 1978 
public works bill, before a subcommittee of the House CommIttee on 
Appropriations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 4, 240-241 (1977); 1977 
Culver Hearings , 291. The system now has more t~an 2500 mIles of 
impounded river. Hearings on Public Works . .. Bill, 1973, before a 
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on AppropnatIons, 92d Cong., 
2d Sess., Part V, 334 (1972). 
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to river conditions, and its only known breeding 
population was located squarely in the midst of the 
proposed im poundmen t. 14 Active searches by TVA in 
more than 60 water courses failed to find other such 
populations. 15 
After unsuccessfully urging the Authority to comply 
with the Act voluntarily in 1974, and urging action 
through the Department of Interior in 1975, the present 
respondents (a regional association of biological scientists, 
local citizens and users of the valley, and a Tennessee 
conservation group) filed suit against the impoundment 
portion of the project . In a trial that was essentially an 
enforcement action they argued that the impoundment 
would threaten the fish with extinction and destroy its 
critical habitat. 
The trial court found that the impoundment portion of 
the project would 
result in the adverse modification, if not complete 
destruction, of the snail darter's critical habitat ... 
[I]t will jeopardize the continued existence of the 
snail darter. Almost all of the known population of 
snail darters will be significantly reduced if not 
completely extirpated ... . [I]t is highly doubtful 
that it would reproduce in a reservoir environment. 
[A. 35, 36.] 
14 Although there are about two dozen darters in the genus Percinn, 
only the snail darter and one other are on the endangered species list 
(50 C.F.R. 17.11). The snail darter is a highly unusual case where 100% 
of an endangered fish population is within , and would be extirpated 
by, a federal project. Another genus also called darters, Etheostoma, 
numbers about a hundred , of which six are listed as endangered 
though none are Similarly threatened by federal projects . 
1.< A. 36; (partial list of rivers searched), A. 410-412. 
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The Sixth Circuit accepted the district court's findings of 
fact, and unanimously reversed the lower court's denial of 
an injunction, on the ground that appropriations bills had 
not impliedly amended the Act to allow extinction of the 
species, that the Act could still be applied to the ongoing 
project, and therefore that the court would enforce the 
law. (A. 81.) 
The snail darter case moved into the Congressional 
forum, as noted below, and to this Court by writ of 
certiorari issued on November 14, 1977. (A. 566.) 
Project status at the time of discovery of the endangered 
species, and after. There is a basic discrepancy between 
the parties' interpretation of the factual record with regard 
to the actual status of the project in 1973 when the 
endangered species was discovered. The Authority alleges 
as fact that the project was "50% complete" or "nearly 
finished"16 in 1973, apparently with regard to budget 
expenditures rather than physical actions. 
16 Pet. Br. 5, 29. The allegation is cited from a passing reference in a 
statement by TVA Chairman Wagner to the House appropriations 
subcommittee. [Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House 
Committee on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 5, 260-262 
(1976).] 
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The following chart shows the actual per year 
expenditures on the Tellico project upto 1973 and 
thereafter: 
Year Funds Expended, 
in Thousands 
1967 $ 4,821 
Cumulative 
Running Total 
1968 6,794 (11,615) 
1969 5,767 (17,382) 
1970 5,176 (22,558) 
1971 4,816 (27,374) 
1972 5,374 (32,748) {Discovery of the 
.. i~~!' .. ... .. .. ~:::~ ..... .... 'i!~:~~~; . .. en!~~~:;:~ :ft:~!es; 
. 1975 17,127 (60,419) 
1976 June 24,928(85,347) 
1977 Jan. 15,651 (100,998) 
1977 Feb. (ca 2,200) (103,198) 
$103,198,000. TOTAL TO FEB. 28, 1977 
[1977 Culver Hearings, 875, (962),provided to witnesses by TVA Public 
Information Office, Feb. 7, 1977; GAO Report, 10.] 
This chart shows that the majority of project expenditures 
to date occurred after 1973; the Authority spent nearly 
twice as much in the four years after the discovery of the 
endangered species and passage of the Act as it had in the 
preceding seven years. 
By the end of 1973 the project had spent $35 .6 million 
dollars out of the present total cost for the project of about 
$120 million. In physical terms, this project expenditure in 
1973 primarily comprised the purchase of project lands, 
and road and bridge improvements; construction of a 
$5 million concrete dam spillway constituted most of the 
remainder. 17 When the sp""e'C'ies was discovered the project 
had been halted for a year and a half by an injunction 
under NEPA. 
17 EOF v. TVA, 339 F. Supp. at 808 (1973); 1977 Culver Hearings. 
962. At the present time completion of the impoundment wo uld 
require tree-clearing and vegetation scraping in the reservoir area. 
excavation and construction work on the inter-reservoir canal, and road 
wo rk. as well as the closing of spillway gates. 
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Project options and modifications available in 1973 and 
thereafter. In the record and decisions below it was 
established that the endangered darter could not survive 
the impoundment of the valley, so that protection of the 
species would require non-reservoir project development 
options . There is an issue between the parties as to the 
existence of various project options and alternatives in 
1973 and thereafter. Since the present case w as litigated as 
an enforcement action, there is no testimony anywhere in 
the record concerning the availability or non-availability 
of such alternatives. 18 
Congress, however, is presently considering available 
alternatives for the development of th e valley with and 
without an impoundment. The primary bas is of this 
review is the 1977 study prepared b y the Comptroller 
General at the request of the H ouse Committee on 
Merchant Marine and Fisheries (General Accounting Of-
fice Tellico Study, supra, 4, at note 1.) The Report concluded 
that alternatives presently exist that require study, that 
the Tellico impoundment project's claimed benefits were 
unreliable, and that the impoundment project should not 
be pursued until after full comparison with a 
"comprehensive riv er-based reg ional development 
project" option and the preparation of reliable econom ic 
figures for both. 19 Substantial portions of the project 
18 The district judge included a statement in his opinion tha t no 
alternatives existed for the impo undment short of scrapping the 
project. (A. 38.) Since no evidence was presented anywhere in the trial 
re cord as to such a lack of alternatives, n o r su ch a finding reques ted , 
the judge's comment mus t be viewed as a limited statement of the 
imp oundment's total incompatibility w ith preservation of the species, or 
as an unsupported dictum. The only incidental references to tha t issue 
at trial n o ted the existen ce of potential alterna tives. (A. 351, 230, 236 .) 
The Cour t of Appeals did not mention the comment and appeared to 
recogn ize the ex istence of al ternatives . (A. 89,90.) 
19 GA O Report at 40,41 . 
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budget were found to b e of di rectly recoverable benefit, 
and p o tential project values without an impou ndmen t 
w ere found to b e s ignificant and comparable to the 
im p oundm en t proj ect . 20 
The presen tly availab le non-reservoir project options 
noted by the GAO included: agricu lt ure, through 
cultivation of th e project's 25,500 acres of prime farmlands 
ins tead o f impounding them; tourism, noting the 
proximity of the Great Smoky Mountains National Park, 
and the major Cherokee historic sites leading to the Park 
along the river; and recreation, noting that flowing water 
recreation is increasingly in demand and increasingly 
scarce, that the valley lands could be developed in 
conjunction with Park recreation traffic, and that other 
recreational potentials existed. 21 Industrial development, 
cultural-historical resources , and other river-based 
development potentials were also noted. The local 
economic impact of these options was discussed as 
cumulative, since the various development alternatives do 
not appear to be incompatible. A second Tellico 
development report was requested in May by the House 
Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife, to be prepared 
by the University of Tennessee School of Architecture 
(hereafter the "Hanson Study"22). Both the GAO Report 
20 ld . at 39-41. As an example, agriculture in the valley might alone 
prod uce n early twice as much return on presen t project assets than an 
impoundment. TVA admitted that agricultural management could 
prod u ce annual yields that "would not total more than about $6 .4 
million annually" - the TVA impoundment is projected to produce 
$3 .7 mi ll ion annually . GAO Report 26,28. 
Extensive tourist and recrea tion benefits for a river alternative, 
drawing u pon the adjacent Great Smoky Mountain National Park , were 
s tated in testimony by the Park Superin tend en t , 1977 Culve r Hearings , 
203-205. See also ld., 866, map of valley historical sites, rep rinted at 
Appendix B, infra . 
2 I ld. at 20-26. 
22 Requested of Dean Donald Hanson, University of Tennessee 
Schoo l of Arch itecture, to be presented in House hearings th is spring; 
prelimina 1Y report p resented at 1977 Cu lver Hearings , 197-203. 
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and the Hanson Study focused upon project alternatives 
that are available at the present time and were available in 
1973. 
TVA reviewed several Tellico project alternatives in the 
project's final 1973 impact statement. The statement 
considered and rejected several forms of impoundment 
and a "scenic stream" corridor along the river banks. 
TVA has not considered the development options noted 
above, and has not considered any mode of development 
for the project's 38,000 acre area without some form of 
reservo ir. 23 
Interagency cooperation. The Endangered Species Act 
requires agency consultation with the Secretary of Interior 
to insure the protection of species and their critical 
habitat. [Guidelines, A. 397; Regulations, 50 C.F.R. 
402.03, 43 Fed. Reg. 870 (1978).] Since 1974, the snail 
darter has been the subject of communication between 
TVA and the Department of Interior's Fish and Wildlife 
Service, chiefly through TVA's Division of Forestry, 
Fisheries and Wildlife Development and the Service's 
Office of Endangered Species. To date, the content of 
TVA's comm unica tion with Interior under the Endangered 
Species Act has been limited to objections and requests to 
transplant the species. 
Petitioner filed extensive comments and objections 
against the listing of the snail darter and its critical 
habitat. 24 Interior reviewed the material and thereafter 
placed the fish on the endangered list by final rule-
making under Section 1533 of the Act in 1975, and 
designated the Little Tennessee River as its critical 
habitat. [A. 377-389, 40 Fed. Reg. 47505, 41 Fed. Reg. 
13926-28, 1975, 1976.] 
23 GAO Report 15-17, 40; A. 139-140,192,240. 
24 A. 362-368, 33. 
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TVA also continuously urged transplantation of the 
population to any of a number of other waters . A limited 
transplant took place but its results are speculative. 25 
Formal "consultation" between TVA and Interior was 
delayed until February 1976, and still to date has been 
limi ted to TVA's proposals for trans plan ting the fish 
somewhere else. TVA's consultations with Interior have 
not included consideration of non-impoundment project 
modifications which would permit the survival of the 
species. 26 In terior has sugges ted such river-based 
development options to TVA in the past, and the 
Secretary's dissenting brief notes that viable project 
25 710 snail darters were transplanted to the upper Hiwassee River, 
water that comes closest to resembling the Li ttle Tennessee, beginning 
in 1975. [A. 264.] The Hiwassee has only a fraction of the amount of 
shoal habitat present in the Little Tennessee, [A. 145-146] and has 
water quality problems from its polluted Ocoee River tributary. TVA 
has asserted that the transplant has been successful, but its estimates 
are based on arithmetical progression of the original 1975 numbers, not 
on field data. [1977 Culver Hearings, 904-905.] Actual TVA field data 
was recently reported to the Department of Interior: "Transects were 
run at the original Hiwassee transplant sites in early December 1977, 
and mean numbers [found] per transect we re 0.00, 0.13, and 0.20 for 
the upper, middle and lower transplant sites respectively. All darters 
observed at these sites were adults." The field teams located some 
juveniles near the Ocoee confluence. The Coy tee shoals in the Little 
Tennessee had 68% of original population numbers. Letter from TVA 
to Office of Endangered Species, January 25, 1978, in Departmental 
files. It may require 5-15 years to establish probable success for 
transplantation even where favorable initial evidence is present. GAO 
Report, 4. 
26 A. 192,249,395; 1977 Culver Hearings, 69, 378-79, 890. TVA took 
the position that no detriment would occur to the species or its habitat 
until impoundment closure itself, so that "there will be ample 
opportunity to obtain the views of the scientific community. . as well 
as to examine further the possibilities of transplantation and the 
present ex istence of the darter at other locations." 1977 Culver 
Hearings, 977, Letter from Interior files, March 12,1975; A. 250. 
II 
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alternatives exist for reconciling project objectives with 
preservation of the species. 27 TVA's consistent position 
has been that 
we shall be glad to consult further if you have any 
additional suggestions or plans to conserve the 
darter which will also allow completion of the 
project . . .. The alternatives which you suggest 
.. , do not allow completion of the project [as 
originally planned] . 28 
Based upon the position taken by the Secretary in the 
dissent to TVA's brief, the Department of Interior appears 
ready to continue substantive discussions with TVA "to 
comply fully with the 'consultation' requirements of 
Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act."29 
The Tellico case in Congress . Since January 1977 when 
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals enjoined the 
impoundment portion of the Tellico project, Congress has 
initiated extensive review procedures on the controversy. 
To prepare a background economic analysis for 
subsequent hearings, the House Merchant Marine and 
Fisheries Committee , which has jurisdiction over the 
Endangered Species Act, requested preparation of the 
GAO Report previously cited (supra, 4, at note 1). The 
Committee requested information on the alternative 
options and economics of the project, with and without 
the dam component; the final report was transmitted 
October 14, 1977. Shortly thereafter, the Subcommittee on 
Fisheries and Wildlife requested preparation of the 
Univers ity of Tennessee's Hanson Study to elaborate the 
development options for a river-based project (supra, 15). 
27 Pet. Br., 3A-4A. 
28 1977 Culve r Hearing s , 960. 
2 Y Pet. Br. , 4A . 
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Overs ight h earings on the Endangered Species Act, 
w ith a special session on Tellico , were held in July, 1977 
in the committee that has Senate jurisdic tion over the Act . 
[H earings in the Subcommittee on Resource Protection of 
the Senate Comm ittee on En vironm ent and Public Works, 
95th Cong ., 1s t Sess. (1977), hereafter "1977 Culver 
H earings" ] and further hearings are being scheduled. At 
th ese Senate hearin gs the General Accounting Office and 
th e Hanson study group presented their findings in 
preliminary form, by leave of the House committee. The 
reports verified the existence of available p roject options 
for protecting the endangered species w hile obtaining 
project benefits. They suggested resolution of the issue 
based upon a compar ison to be d eveloped between 
comprehensive river-based d evelopm en t options and the 
original impoundmen t p roject updated and with corrected 
benefi t figures. 
At the Culver hearings there was extensive testimony 
from the lead agencies, the Departrnen ts of In terior and 
Commerce, that the Endangered Species Act has been 
working well to resolve project species conflicts if agencies 
consulted in good faith. In four years experience there 
have been 4500 potential conflicts , and only three fail ed of 
administrative resolution and came to court .30 Of these 
three only Tellico has come to Congress. No examples 
were shown by any w itness of project/species conflicts 
arising under the Ac t that were not resolvable by good 
faith consultation . A series of federal agency witnesses 
testified that Section 7 was occasionally burdensome, but 
was a workable statute . TVA was the only agency taking 
an opposite position. 3] The session specifically devoted to 
Tellico focused primarily upon the value of existing 
project resources in the unflooded valley and the 
advantages of alternative project options . 
.10 1977 Culver Hea rings, 61. 63-64, 69-70 . 
31 l d ., 366. 
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Several specific amendments to the Endangered Species 
Act have been proposed in Congress to resolve the Tellico 
conflict. Of the bills submitted, one would specifically 
exempt the Tellico impoundment from the Act. [H.R. 
4457, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.] Three would exempt Tellico 
along with other projects underway in January 1967. [H.R. 
4167, H.R. 5002, H.R. 5079, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.] No 
action has been taken on these bills. 
As the petitioner's brief notes, the appropriations 
committees have also had the Tellico issue before them 
over the years, and, as part of the Authority's annual 
lump sum grant, the project received funding each fiscal 
year. On various occasions TVA witnesses informed one 
or both of the committees of the existence of the snail 
darter, the Authority's opinion that the Act did not apply 
to Tellico, and their belief that successful transplants 
would resolve the issue. The House appropriations 
committee added a comment in its 1975 report stating that 
the dam "should be completed as promptly as possible"32 
without mentioning the endangered species issue. 
In 1975-76 the House and Senate committees with 
jurisdiction over the Endangered Species Act held 
hearings on suggested amendments to the Act, including 
an amendment to relieve ongoing business enterprises 
from restrictions on certain pre-Act inventories. TVA did 
not attend or raise its endangered species issue in either 
hearing. 33 The 1976 Senate appropriations report noted 
31 H.R. Rep. No. 94-319, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1975). 
3.1 Hearings on Endangered Species Act Amendments, before the 
Environment Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 
and before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Merchant 
Marine and Fisheries, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) . The hearings led to 
the Endangered Species Act Amendments, P.L. 94-359 (1976) (the 
"Scrimshaw Act"). S. Rep. No. 94-960, 94th Cong., 2d Sess . 96 (1976). 
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the endangered species issue, and added that the 
committee "does not view the Endangered Species Act as 
prohibiting the completion of the Tellico project at its 
advanced stage ... "34 
The 1977 House appropriations report repeated this 
view, and recommended that agencies cooperate with 
1 . fl ' t 35 In terior on species relocation to reso ve pro) ect con IC s. 
In the 1977 hearings, TVA witnesses informed the 
appropriations committees that transplantation was likely 
to succeed and that TVA had requested delisting of the 
species by Interior to resolve the issue. 36 
The subsequent Senate appropriations report stated that 
it had "carefully reviewed" Tellico and approved 
appropriations "based on the Committee's view of the 
Endangered Species Act and its [limited] application" to 
TellicoY The 1977 appropriations act itself did not refer to 
the project, but included an extra grant of $2 million to \ 
TVA generally, n o carry out the purposes of the . .. Act 
. .. as amen~ed, including cooperative efforts as 
contemplated by that Act to relocate endangered .. . 
species to other suitable habitats as may be necessary to 
expedite project construction ./I 
The same provision was inserted in other agencies' 
gran ts. 38 On the House floor Congressman Bevill 
34 S. Rep. No . 94-960 , 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1976). 
" H.R. Rep. No . 95-379, 95 th Cong. , 1st Sess. 103 (1977) . 
. 11, The transplant's results to date have been unclear. See 511pm , 17, 
note 25; the delisting petition was rejected on its biological facts by the 
Department of Interior on December 5, 1977. 
37 S. Rep. No. 95-301, 95th Cong ., 1st Sess. 98-99 (1977). 
.18 PL. 95-96, 91 Stat. 797 , 800, 802 , 808 (1977). 
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expressed the committee's confidence in the success of 
relocations, doubts about the motivation of citizen 
enforcement of the Endangered Species Act, their 
encouragement to TVA to find equitable solutions 
to the endangered species problem, and their 
recommendation that funding continue. On only one 
occasion, in 1976, an appropriations committee heard a 
statement in opposition to the project concerning the 
endangered snail darter. 39 
House and Senate hearings on Tellico and Section 7 are 
currently being scheduled by the committees with 
jurisdiction over the Act, for review of the GAO Report, 
of agency implementation of the Act, and of public policy 
resolutions for the longstanding Tellico issue. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Petitioner seeks to persuade this Court to fashion some 
form of implied amendment for it, on any of several 
attenuated theories, so as to relieve it of a statutory duty 
to prevent extinction of species which it has consistently 
refused to comply with since 1973. 
I 
Despite the past and present availability of viable 
project modifications for reconciling Tellico's economic 
benefits with species preservation, petitioner argues that 
----
3Y Hearings on Public Works for Water and Power Development 
and Energy Research Appropria tions Bill, 1977, before a Subcommittee 
of the House Committee on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 
8, 979-984 (1976), testimony by respondent Hiram Hill, Jr.. The two 
members present asked two questions, one doubting Mr. Hill's 
interpretation of the law and one doubting that the fish did not live 
elsewhere. 
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it should be impliedly exempted from the Act because the 
project was underway when the Act was passed and the 
darter discovered. The Act, however, is quite clear in its 
mandatory application to all federal agencies. It requires 
species protection and good faith consultation concerning 
all prospective federal actions which threaten the 
destruction of a species and its critical habitat . There is no 
express grandfather clause in Section 7, and in light of 
legislative history and subsequent Congressional action it 
is clear that one was not implied . 
(" 1 the facts here, the large majority of project actions 
remained to be taken when the Act was passed and the 
endangered species discovered, further major action still 
remains to be taken, and viable project modifications still 
exist. Since d iscovery of the species, TVA has consistently 
refused to consult with Interior as required by the Act on 
any project modifications that did not include an 
impoundment, has accelerated construction and doubled 
its expenditures, and now urges that all project options 
have been foreclosed. 
TVA's request for an implied exemption attempts to 
extend statutory construction law far beyond existing 
holdings. To date, courts have consistently refused to 
exempt federal projects from federal statutes where 
substantial actions remained and the law could be 
meaningfully applied so as to effectuate Congressional 
intent. In such circumstances, as cases under the National 
Environmen tal Policy Act and in other areas of 
administrative law demonstrate, the law is to be applied. 
Where a federal agency decl ines to comply with the law, 
the courts must enforce it, after which "[T]he appropriate 
forum to resolve this complex and con trovers ial issue is 
not the court's but the Congress." (A. 93-94, citing W('st 
Virginia Division of Izaak Walton League v. Butz, 522 F.2d 
945, 955 (C A. 4, 1976).) 
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Congress' response to Tellico since the Sixth Circuit's 
decision reinforces the wisdom of this separation of 
powers rationale. The application of the Act to the Tellico 
case has prevented the very extinction of endangered 
species that Congress sought to prevent, and is permitting 
Congress to study and consider a variety of compromises 
and alternatives that would reconcile the competing public 
interests . 
II 
Similarly, Petitioner's arguments for an implied 
amendment by appropriations are not supported by the 
facts, the law, or Congress' subsequent actions on Tellico. 
Amendments by implication are disfavored generally, but 
are especially suspect when the alleged amendment arises 
from a subsequent appropriations bill. Committee for 
Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 785 
(C.A.D.C.). 
On the appropriations record here, the implied 
amendment argument for the Tellico project is particularly 
tenuous. The only statutory mention of the Endangered 
Species Act in a TVA appropriations was a special grant 
of additional funds for carrying out the purposes of the 
Act, a provision which does not mention Tellico, is 
identical to those included in other agencies' grants, and 
which does not reflect an intent to amend any provision 
of the Act. Similarly the legislative his tory of the TVA 
appropriations reflects the appropriations committees' 
desire to fund the project, their opinion that the Act 
should not stop public works projects, and their belief 
that transplantation would solve any conflicts - not their 
intention to change existing law. To be even colorable, an 
implied amendment argument must show evidence of 
Congressional intent to amend; where none exists, the 
argument is doubly unfounded. 
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Given the presumption against implied amendments by 
appropriations and the House and Senate rules against 
substantive amendments in appropriations bills, it is not 
surprising that the large majority of cases reaching the 
argument have rejected it. In some very limited situations, 
appropriations acts have been allowed to have substantive 
effect, as when used by some courts in ambiguous 
circumstances to ratify an agency's expanded 
interpretation of its authority under enabling acts, or to 
ratify an executive order on reorganization. The 
presumption is far more rigid where the implied 
amendment argument is used to attempt to reverse an 
express Congressional statute. Appropriations acts have 
been allowed to repeal a substantive act of Congress in 
only a few extremely rare cases, where strict and narrow 
tests were met: the text of the appropriations act itself 
must include language that shows Congress' intent to 
amend the substantive statute, there must be a clear 
unambiguous legislative history expressing an intent to 
amend existing law, and the two Congressional acts must 
be mutually irreconcilable . TVA meets none of these tests . 
The appropriations committees, finally, do not have 
Congressional jurisdiction over the Endangered Species 
Act and did not review the Tellico case's administrative 
record or project options under the Act. The House and 
Senate committees which do have proper jurisdiction over 
the Act are now actively reviewing the case and do not 
appear to consider the Act repealed by appropriations. 
In short, the Tellico case is presently being weighed in 
all its political , economic, and biological complexity by 
Congress, the proper forum in our system for making the 
difficult decision of how best to reconcile conflicting 
public policies, economics, and agency actions . In seeking 
an implied amendment on this record, petitioner asks the 
Court to act as a super-legislature, a role it has long and 
properly declined. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
SECTION 7 OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
PROHIBITS THE IMPOUNDMENT PORTION OF THE 
TELLICO PROJECT 
In 1973, when Congress by overwhelming margins 
enacted the Endangered Species Act, with strong 
enforcement provisions, it declared a serious and 
farsigh ted national policy of protecting endangered 
species from extinction. 
These species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of 
esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, 
recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and 
its people . ... 1 
From all evidence available to us, it appears that 
the pace of disappearance of species is accelerating 
... Our ability to destroy, or almost destroy, all 
intelligent life on the planet became apparent only 
in this generation. A certain humility, and a sense 
of urgency, seem indicated. 2 
Tennessee's snail darter presents a dramatic example of 
the Act accomplishing its special purposes . Having been 
successively eliminated from its prior range in the 
unimpounded Tennessee river system, the snail darter 
survives now as a sensitive barometer of the extraordinary 
qualities of the Little Tennessee River's last undammed 
stretch, for humans as well as wildlife . It is difficult to 
consider the species separately from the environmental 
qualities it depends on w h ich motiva ted the public 
defense of the valley long before the exis tence of the 
darter was know n. If the darter is extinguished in its las t 
1 Section 2, 87 Sta t. 884, 16 U.S .c. §1531 (Supp. V, 1973). 
2 H .R. Rep . No . 93-412, 93d Cong ., 1st Sess. 4,5 (1973). 
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remaining habitat, humans as well will have lost the last 
such river and valley resources in the region. If, on the 
other hand, the agency enters into full consultation with 
the Secretary and complies with the law, those resources 
can be preserved and developed for public benefit, and 
the species and its habitat will survive. 
Petitioner has sought to avoid the application of Section 
7 since 1973 when it learned of the endangered species' 
existence .3 Alone among federal agencies it has 
consistently refused to enter into meaningful consultation 
to achieve Congress' purposes. N ow TVA asks the Court 
to weaken the Act by fashioning some theory to relieve it 
of its duty to obey the law. Respondents respectfully 
submit that the Sixth Circuit was right in unanimously 
rejecting such requests for judicial legislation. TVA's I 
arguments would result in the first conscious extinction of 
a living species in human history, and as the current 
review in Congress is demonstrating, Tellico is no place to 
start such a sad precedent. 
A. SECTION 7 PROHIBITS FEDERAL ACTIONS WHICH 
WOULD RENDER AN ENDANGERED SPECIES EX-
TINCT. 
Petitioner no longer contests the finding of the district 
court that closure of the dam would "result in the adverse 
modification, if not complete destruction" of the critical 
habitat of the species, eliminating its requirements for life 
and reproduction, and thus jeopardizing its continued 
existence. 4 The plain meaning of section 7 forbids this 
result. 
3 Statement, supra, note s 26-29, 31. See also Argument I B, infra . 
4 Opinion of the District Court, 419 F. Supp . 753, 757. As the Court 
of Appeals stated, "TVA concedes the existence of a predictable causal 
nexus between the impoundment of the Little Tennessee and the 
ultimate depletion of the snail darter population." [549 F.2d 1064, 
1070.] 
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The language of the Act is clear and manda tory. Section 
7 requires that "all Federal departments and agencies shall 
insure" that their actions do not jeopardize the exis tence 
of endangered species or destroy their critical habitat. As 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held in National Wildlife 
Federation v . Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 371 (C.A. 5), cert. 
denied , sub nom . Boteler v. National Wildlife Federation, 429 
U.S . 979, "Section 7 imposes on federal agencies the 
mandatory duty to insure" protection of endangered 
species. 5 The mandatory language is a marked departure 
from the less stringent provisions of the 1966 and 1969 
predecessors to the 1973 Act. 6 Those prior Acts were 
"limited to a few designated agencies and ... hedged by 
considerations of what was 'practicable and consistent 
with the primary purposes' of those agencies ."7 
The 1966 and 1969 statutes, in other words, pennitted 
the sacrifice of endangered species to the missions of the 
various federal agencies - precisely the result that 
petitioner seeks here . The report of the House Merchant 
Marine and Fisheries Committee on the present Section 7, 
however, emphasized the different course taken in the 
1973 Act. Section 7 -
requIres the Secretary and the heads of all other 
Federal departments and agencies to use their 
5 In Coleman, the Court of Appeals enjoined the Department of 
Transportation from continuing the construction of an interchange and 
5.7 mile segment of interstate highway. The court found that 
construction threatened the existence of the Mississippi Sandhill Crane, 
an endangered species, and also threatened the modification and 
destruction of its critical habitat. See also, Note, Obligations of Federa l 
Agencies Under Section 7 of the Endangered Speci es Act, 28 Stanford L. 
Rev. 1247, ' 1252-58 (1976). 
6 Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. 89-669, 80 
Stat. 926; Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-135, 
83 Stat. 275, repealed Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 USC 1531 
et seq, 
7 Bean, The Evolution of National Wildlife Law, 387 (1977); see also 
Note, Obligations of Federal Agencies Under Section 7 of the Endangered 
Species Act, 28 Stanford L. Rev, 1247, 1253-54 (1976), 
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authorities in order to carry out programs for the 
protection of endangered species, and it further 
requires that those agencies take the necessary 
action that will not jeopardize the continuing 
existence of endangered species or result in the 
destruction of critical habitat of those species. 8 
Petitioner nonetheless reads the legislative history of 
the 1973 Act as requiring agencies to engage in a 
"balancing process," pennitting them to proceed with a 
project even though it would destroy an endangered 
species, if the agencies "concluded that the public interest 
warranted it." (Pet. Br., 33.) Petitioner has found "two 
relevant discussions" in the legislative history of the Act 
to support this far-reaching view. In one, Congressman 
Dingell, author of the present Section 7, emphaSized its 
mandatory nature during House debate, by referring to 
the threat to the whooping crane from Air Force bombing 
practice. Petitioner cites (at Pet. Br., 34) the following 
portion of Mr. Dingell's statement [119 Congo Rec . 42913 
(1973)]: 
Under existing law, the Secretary of Defense has 
some discretion as to whether or not he will take 
the necessary action . . . to see that this threat 
disappears. . . . [O]nce the bill is enacted, he or 
any subsequent Secretary of Defense would be 
required to take the necessary steps. 
Mr. Dingell, however, went on to say (Id .) 
It is a pity that we must wait until a species is 
faced with extennination . . . but at least when and 
8 H.R, Rep, No , 93-412 , 93d Cong" 1st Sess. 14 (1973) (emphasis 
supplied), 
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if that unfortunate stage is reached, the agencies of 
governmen t can no longer plead that they can do 
nothing about it. They can, and they must. The 
law is clear. 9 
The other discussion involved a question by Senator 
Cook of Kentucky, who wanted to be sure that the Army 
Corps of Engineers would not be able to build a proposed 
road through a nesting area for wild turkeys. In Senate 
hearings on a draft bill with language essentially identical 
to that of Section 7, Senator Cook was told by 
Administration witnesses that the provision "for the first 
9 Petitioner suggests the law is not clear, particularly urging that 
the term "actions" is ambiguous (Pet. Br. 25-26). Even beyond this, 
TVA states, " ... it is well established that even the unambiguous 
meaning of statutory words does not control when such a reading 
would be unreasonable in view of the statute's purpose" (Pet. Br. 25). 
The cases offered in support of this proposition, however, do not 
suggest such a liberal approach to statutory construction. Petitioner 
cites Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S . 457, as 
principal support for its rule of judicial interpretation. This Court, 
however, in the later case of Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S . 55, explained 
that the Holy Trinity principle is strictly limited in application to " ... 
rare and exceptional circumstances . .. And there must be something 
to make plain the intent of Congress that the letter of the statute is not 
to prevail." 282 U.S. at 60. 
Courts have chosen to enforce other than the literal meaning of 
statutory language only when that literal meaning was " plainly at 
variance" with the purposes of the statute, United States v. American 
Trucking Assns., Inc. , 310 U.S. 534, 543, or where such a reading 
"would generate constitutional doubts," Unit ed States v. Witkovich, 353 
U.S . 194, 199. Application of Section 7 to the impoundment portion of 
the Tellico project raises no constitutional questions (see notes 28, 29 
infra), and it is not the plain meaning of "actions," but rather TVA's 
forced construction that is in conflict with the important and urgent 
purposes of the Endangered Species Act. The Court of Appeals wrote: 
To countenance so restrictive a construction of §1536, in the 
absence of reinforcement from the Act's legislative history , 
would, in our view, be inimical to achieving its objectives. We 
choose instead to give the term" actions" its plain meaning in 
the belief that this best effectuates the will of the Congress. 
[549 F.2d at 1070-71 , A. 88.] 
See also Note, Obliga tions of Federal Agencies Under Section 7 of the 
Endangered Species Act, 28 Stanford L. Rev. 1247, 1252 (1976). 
-
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time would prohibit another federal agency from taking 
action which does jeopardize the status of endangered 
species ."lO Petitioner relies on Senator Tunney's doubts, 
expressed in floor debate, that a slightly different bilP 1 
would prohibit that same road in Kentucky (Pet. BL, 
32-33). In weighing Senator Tunney's opinion, it is 
relevant that part of the Senate version of Section 7 to 
which he referred implied some agency discretion, 
providing that they must carry out "such programs as are 
practicable for the protection of species listed ."12 The 
conference committee selected the House version of 
Section 7 in preference to the Senate version . 13 
In a case involving a similar substantive statutory 
mandate, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 
401 U.S. 402, this Court rejected a claim that the special 
parklands protection statutes allowed the Department of 
Transportation to build an interstate highway through a 
public park after balancing various competing interests. 
The Court said "if Congress intended these factors to be 
on an equal footing with preservation of parkland, there 
In Section 3(d) of S. 1592, 93d Cong ., 1st Sess. (1973), replinted in 
Hearings on the Endangered Species Act of 1973 Before the 
Subcommittee on the Environment of the Senate Committee on 
Commerce , 93d Cong., 1st. Sess. 7, 68 (1973). 
I I Section 7 of S. 1983, 93d Cong. , 1st Sess., 119 CONGo REC. 25664 
(1973). 
12 Id. (emphasis supplied). 
13 Compare Section 7(a) of H.R. 37, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. , 119 CONGo 
REC. 30159 (1973) with Section 7 of S. 1983, supra note 11 , and with 
Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act. 
Despite this legislative history, Petitioner argues that the subsequen t 
committee discussion and appropriations to TVA suggest that Congress 
did not intend Section 7 to apply to ongoing projects. (Pet . Br. 34-38). 
Petitioner's reliance on the language of later legislation is open to 
question. Argument II , infra. Moreover, the cases cited by petitioner 
are not applicable. Both Fleming V. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 
U.s. 111, 116, and Brooks V. O('(unr, 313 U.s. 354, 360, permitted 
subsequent ratification of an agency interpretation only where that 
interpretation was consistent with the purpose of the primary statute. 
Surely TVA cannot intend to argue that impoundment will advance the 
purposes of the Endangered Species Act. 
I, 
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would have been no need for the statutes." 401 U.s. at 
412. Just as those statutes gave special protection to 
parklands in Overton Park, Section 7 of the Endangered 
Species Act of 1973 (unlike its predecessors) was designed 
to give special substantive protection to endangered 
species. 
The Endangered Species Act is clear. Neither its 
language nor its legislative history leaves any room for 
TVA's view that its mission gives it discretion to 
subordinate the protection of the species to closure of the 
dam. Section 7 prohibits petitioner from rendering the 
species extinct. 
B. SECTION 7 REQUIRES PETITIONER TO CONSULT 
WITH THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR CONCERNING 
MODIFICA TION OF THE TELLICO PROJECT TO IN-
SURE PRESERVATION OF THE SPECIES. 
Congress recognized in adopting the Endangered 
Species Act that many federal agency actions would 
potentially jeopardize the existence of endangered species. 
To resolve these potential conflicts in the most expedient 
way possible, Section 7 requires that "all ... Federal 
departments and agencies shall, in consultation with and 
with the assistance of the Secretary, utilize their 
authorities" for the preservation of endangered species. 
Since the Act was passed in 1973, there have been more 
than 4,500 such potential conflicts, and hundreds of 
formal or informal consultations. 14 Interagency 
consultation has failed, resulting in litigation, only three 
times. Of these, only in this case has the conflict been 
presented to Congress for resolution . l s Petitioner's 
unreasonably narrow construction of the mandatory 
consultation requirement has led inevitably to that result. 
14 1977 Culver Hearings, 61 , 63-64, 69-70. 
I S ld. 
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The consultation requirement is an integral part of the 
Section 7 prohibition against the eradication of 
endangered species by federal agencies. Consultation is 
not satisfied by paper shuffling and symbolic gestures; it 
must be entered with an open mind and continue until 
the exis tence of the species is no longer in jeopardy . 1 6 As 
the Fifth Circuit stated in Coleman, supra, "[f]ederal 
agencies are required to consult and obtain the assistance 
of the Secretary before taking any actions which may 
affect endangered species or critical habitat." 529 F.2d at 
371. This provision, as the Secretary has stated, requires 
full consultation on project alternatives and modifications. 
"Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, as applied to \ 
\ 
on-going projects, was intended to insure a rigorous 
review of alternatives in the event completion of a project 
would extirpate a listed endangered species." [Pet. Br. at 
l 4A.] 
In emphasizing that such consultation must be 
"meaningful," the Coleman court enjoined construction of 
the highway 
un til the Secretary of the Department of Interior 
determines that the necessary modifications are 
made in the highway project to insure that it will 
.....----
no longer jeopardize the con tinued existence of the 
Mississippi Sandhill Crane, or destroy or modify 
[its] critical habitat . [529 F.2d at 371, 375 .] 
Petitioner has thus far failed to comply with this 
requiremen t, and has continued and increased its 
impoundment work since 1973 with full notice of the 
threats it was creating for the endangered species. 17 TVA 
16 " ..• [Glood faith consultation shall preclude a federal agency 
from making an irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources 
which would foreclose the consideration of modifications or 
alternatives to the identified activity or program." 50 C.F.R. 402.04, 43 I 
Fed. Reg. 875 . ~ 
17 Sta tement, supra, 10, at note 11. 
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has been in communication with the Department of 
Interior s ince 1974, but the communications have largely 
been limited to objections against Interior's protective 
actions and listing, and TVA's requests that the species be 
put somewhere else. The only project modification18 that 
TVA has been willing to consider to effect the purposes of 
the Act is transplantation of the species out of its natural 
habitat, and there is no available scientific evidence 
indicating that these darters can be successfully 
transplanted . (supra, 17, at note 25.) When asked during 
the 1977 Culver hearings to characterize TVA's 
cooperation, Mr. Keith Schreiner, Associate Director of 
the Department of Interior's, Fish and Wildlife Service, 
responded: 
I am, of course, reluctant to be highly critical of a 
fellow federal agency so let me simply say this: By 
and large coopera tion with other Federal agencies 
has been quite good .... For the most part federal 
agencies have been cooperative and openminded, 
during the consultation process. TVA was, in my 
view, cooperative so long as we were not 
discussing in any w ay preventing the closing of the 
darn. Most of their consultation was preceded with 
this thought: "we will consult until you guys are 
sick of it as long as we don't talk about not closing 
the darn. But it's going to close . .. ". That is not 
full cooperation, Mr. Chairman, in my view. [1977 
Culver Hearings, 377-378.] 
In its failure to consult with the Secretary concerning 
the full range of project modifications available and 
necessary to protect the continued existence of the 
species, petitioner has violated Section 7. 
18 Petitioner has had ample opportunity to modify the Tellico 
project so as to comply with Section 7, and to consult with the 
Secretary toward that end. An agency with full knowledge of statutory 
law and material facts cannot foreclose alternatives by proceeding with 
construction, and then claim that it would be unreasonable and 
wasteful to apply the law. Steubing v. Brinegar , 51] F.2d 489 (CA. 2). 
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C SECTION 7 APPLIES TO ONGOING PROJECTS SUCH AS 
TELLICO. 
1. The Act Does Not Contain an Implied Ex-
emption for the Impoundment Portion of 
the Tellico Project. 
Section 7 contains no grandfather clause, nor is it 
proper to imply one here . When Congress believes it is 
necessary to relieve ongoing projects or enterprises from 
its legislation, it inserts a grandfather clause or other 
express language providing that the statute shall not affect 
particular projects commenced before a certain date. 19 In 
light of the urgency Congress has attached to preventing 
the extinction of living species, it is unlikely that 
Congress intended an unexpressed exemption for ongoing 
projects. "To the extent that these long range remedial 
objectives can be realized in continuing projects, it cannot 
be expected that Congress would forsake them without 
even a hint to that effect."2o 
19 Cf. Department of Transportation Act of 1966, as amended, 82 Stat. 
824,49 U .S.C §1653(f) : "After August 23, 1968, the Secretary shall not 
approve any program or project which requires the use of any ~ublicly 
owned land from a public park .. . ", and the recent act on DeSIgn and 
Construction of Public Bui ldings to Accommodate Physically 
Handicapped, 42 U.S.C §4151, Definitions: If • •• the term 'building' 
means any building ... to be leased ... [or] to be financed . . . by the 
United States after Aug. 12, 1968 . .. . If • 
In considering the applicability of the National Bank Enabhng 
Amendment of 1930, 46 Stat. 809, 12 U.s.C 90, this Court stated In 
McNair v . Knott, 302 U.s. 369, 371: 
The amendment does not expressly exclude existing 
contracts from its field of operation . . .. If Congress had 
desired to limit the remedial grant to subsequent security 
contracts, it would doubtless have provided an additional 
limitation relating to prior agreements. Congress alone had the 
power to write such a limitation in the bill. This it did not do . . 
20 Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d. 885, 889 (1st Cir.); see also McNair v. 
Knott, supra note 19; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 
467,469; James v. Milwaukee, 83 U .S. (16 Wall.) 159, 161. 
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That the absence of an express exemption reflects a 
conscious decision not to restrict the application of 
Section 7 is indicated by the fact that Congress did 
include an express exemption clause elsewhere in the Act. 
Under Section 10(b)(1) , 16 U.S .c. §1539(b)(1), the 
Secretary may allow hardship exemptions for private 
citizens who en tered into contracts prior to notice in the 
Federal Register of consideration of species for protection 
under the Act .21 In 1976, when Congress decided that a 
limited exemption was necessary to relieve the 
p rohib ition on trade in certain pre-Act whale ivory 
products, it passed a specific amendment to do so. 
[Endangered Species Act Amendments, P.L. 94-359, 90 
Stat. 911 (1976), the "Scrimshaw Act" .] Most s ignificantly, 
Congress is now considering several bills to accomplish 
what petitioner asserts Congress has already impliedly 
done - exemption of the impoundment portion of the 
Tellico project from the Act. [H .R. 4457, 4167, 95th Cong ., 
1st Sess. (1977).)22 
2 1 The omission of any express exemption for ongoing agency 
'projects has even greater significance in light of another fact. Congress 
had just concluded a review of the National Environmental Policy Act; 
it knew well the issue of implied exemptions for ongoing agency 
projects, If it wished to exempt such projects, it would have done so 
expressly. Joint Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Interior and 
Insular Affairs and the COI;l1mittee on Public Works on the Operation of 
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 427 
(1972) . 
22 It is not at all unusual for Congress to enact legislation to exempt 
a specific project or type of project from the application of a prior 
general statute. For example, the right-of-way limitation of the Mineral 
Leasing Act of 1920 was amended in 1973 to permit construction of the 
trans-Alaska oil pipeline, Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87 Stat. 576; the enjOined 
San Antonio freeway was exempted from NEPA by Federal-Aid 
Highway Act of 1973, Section 154 of 87 Stat. 250; Congress also 
provided certain exemptions to NEPA requirements in the Disaster 
Relief Act of 1974, §405, 42 U.s.c. §5175 and in the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,33 U.s.C §1371(c). 
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The regulations and guidelines issued by the Secretary 
of Interior, who has "primary responsibility for 
implementing Section 7," Coleman, supra, 529 F.2d at 3~3 , 
confirm the application of the Act to Tellico .23 The Intenor 
Department has interpreted Section 7 as full.y applicable to 
fede ral actions which were planned or partIally completed 
prior to enactment of the Act in 197~. ~he orig~n.al 
guidelines issued under the Act make thIS VIew explICIt, ~~ 
~ring agencies to com~ly whe~ever. ~)P{),' 
substantial work remams to be done WhICh wou~d~ 
-indepe~den t--o f th-e e-ffe ct o f ear lier work 
Performed, in and of itself jeopardize. the 
continued existence of a listed species or modIfy or 
'destroy critical habitat .. . . If the Federal presence 
ana- controtremains to be felt . .. or such work on 
a Federal project remains to be performed, then the 
requirements of Section 7 should be satisfied. 24 
The final Regulations issued on January 4, 1978 by ~he 
Secretary to implement the Act confirm this long standmg t2t{(S. 
interpretation by the Department: 
Section 7 applies to all activities or programs where 
Federal involvemen t or control remains which in 
itself could jeopardize the continued exis tence of a 
listed species or modify or destroy its critical 
habitat .25 
- - -
23 See a/so, Views of Th e Secretary of th e Interior, (Pet . Br. 2A)., 
24 Guidelines to Assist Federal Agencies in Complying wi th Sect/on 7 of 
th e Endangered Sp ecies Act of 1973, I (D) (1 ) (A. 402). 
25 50 C.F .R. 402 .03, 43 Fed . Reg . 870, 875 . 
Petitioner implies that President Carter disag reed with this standard: 
" President Carter, howeve r, .. , stated: .. , 'Major projects now 
underway that are found to pose a serious th~~at to endangered speCles 
should be reassessed on a case-by-case bas Is. (Pe t. Br. 28-29, note 21). 
This comment was made prior to the 1977 Senate Heanngs , In whIch 
the Administration made clear that this rev iew was to be conducted by 
Congress. Therefore, la nguage in the prea~ble to the. pnor 
Administration's proposed regulations, that lmphed an exemptIon for 
some ongoing projects, was stricken. 
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Since significant proposed federal actions remain to be 
taken on the proposed Tellico impoundment - excavation 
and construction on the interreservoir canal, tree cutting 
and ground scraping in the reservoir area, as well as 
closure of spillway gates - the Department of Interior's 
administrative determination, made clear through its 
guidelines and regulations, requires the application of 
Section 7 to Tellico. This determination is entitled to 
considerable judicial deference. 26 As the Department of 
Interior has concluded, "Petitioner's exemption argument 
would, if adopted, undermine the effective imple-
mentation of Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act" 
(Pet . Br., SA) . 
In the face of this clear applicability of the Section 7 
requirements to the impoundment portion of the Tellico 
project, petitioner urges that the Court invoke a 
presumption against retroactive application of 'statutes 
(Pet. Br., 29). Petitioner's reliance on this presumption is 
misplaced. 
First, the Endangered Species Act is being applied only 
prospectively, where significant Federal agency actions 
remain to be taken which will jeopardize endangered 
species. It is irrelevant to Congress' public purpose that 
the remaining actions are later phases of an ongoing 
project.27 
26 Udall v. Tallman, 308 U.s. 1; Norwegian Ni trogen Co . v. United 
States, 288 U.s. 294, 315. 
27 Jo nes v. Lynn , 477 F.2d 885, 889 (CA. 1) (application of NEPA to 
redevelopment project well underway held not retroactive); Jicarilla 
Apache Tribe of Indians v . Morton, 471 F.2d. 1275, 1282 (CA . 9) 
(application of NEPA to power plant project); fDF v. TVA, 468 F.2d. 
1164, 1171 (CA. 6) (application of NEPA to Tell ico project) . See also 
FHA v . The Darlington , In c., 358 U.S. 84,91 (application of Housing Act 
?f 1954, 68 Stat. 610, 12 U .S.C §1731(b) (Supp. V) to FHA mortgage 
Insurance obtained in 1949 held to be prospective only since future 
actlOn alone was affected); Fleming v. Rhodes , 331 U.S. 100, 107 
(application of Price Control Extension Act of July 25 , 1946, 60 Stat. 664, 
to enjOin ev iction held to be regulation of future action on ly although 
landlords had obtained state judgments before enactment). 
1 . 
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Second, courts invoke the presumption to avoid 
retroactive interference with private righ ts protected by a 
specific Constitutional provision, most commonly the Due 
Process Clause or the Con tract Clause .28 Even if this 
application were retroactive, TV A, as an instrumentality 
of the Federal government, does not possess private 
property interests pro tected from retroactive application of 
subsequent legislation .29 The presumption, therefore , 
does not apply . 
Petitioner is asking this Court to legislate an exemption 
from the well-defined requirements of Section 7. Such an 
exemption is contrary to the language of the Act, the 
legislative his tory, its judiCial and administrative 
interpretation, and principles of statutory construction. 
2. Analogous Decisions Under NEPA Clearly 
Support Application of Section 7 to the Im-
poundment Portion of the Tellico Project. 
Contrary to the petitioner's repeated suggestion, 
analogous cases under NEPA overwhelmingly support 
application of the Endangered Species Act to the 
impoundment actions which remain to be taken. Indeed , 
the history of the development of NEPA case law is 
28 E.g. McNair v. Knott, 302 U.s . 369; Louisville Joint Stockland Bank 
v. Radford , 295 U.s. 555; Norman v. Baltimore & O.R. .Co. , 294 U.S . 240; 
League v. Texas, 184 U.s. 156. See Hochman, The Supreme Court and th e 
Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 Harv . L. Rev. 692 , 694 
(1960). 
29 As a crea ture of Congress, initiated, regulated, and subject to 
liquidation if Congress so chooses, TVA can acquire no vested interest 
in continued Congressional authorization . Pittman v. Hom e Owners' 
Loan Corp., 308 U.S. 21; Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co ., 390 U.S. 1; 
Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v . Reconstruction Finance Co ., 282 F.2d 
439 (CA. 9). Even private property interests may be subject to 
subsequent legislation. FB .A. v. Th e Darlington, Il1 c., 358 U.s. 84; 
No rma n v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 295 U.s. 240; Union Bridge Co. v. 
Unit ed States, 204 U.s. 364 . See Hochman , supra note 28 . 
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particularly instructive in indicating how little judicial 
support exists for petitioner's approach to the ongoing 
project question. 30 A few early NEPA decisions did 
suggest that a similar exemption from the environmental 
impact statement requirement might be implied if the 
"critical action" had occurred prior to NEPA's passage.31 
But the overwhelming majority of courts have explicitly 
rejected that approach, holding NEPA applicable to an 
ongoing project as long as any action remains to be taken 
which, in the words of the statute, would be 
environmentally "significant."32 Thus, in an earlier Tellico 
case, the Sixth Circuit denied another TVA claim of 
implied exemption, and adopted the standard of the 
NEPA guidelines issued by the CEQ: 
... Congress envisaged on-going agency attempts 
to minimize environmental harm caused by the 
implementation of agency programs. This could 
encompass not only constant reevaluations of 
projects already begun to determine whether 
alterations can be made in existing features or 
whether there are alternatives to proceeding with 
projects as initially planned, but also the 
30 Petitioner advances two allied arguments, without clearly 
delineating them. It is argued, first, that Section 7 should not apply to 
actions that are " functionally a part of actions already carried out." 
(Pet. Br. 20). This argument is similar to the "critical action" formula of 
a few early NEPA cases, which refused to apply the statute where some 
identifiable action, usually design or funding approval , had taken place 
prior to enactment. 
Petitioner also suggests, through closely allied but somewhat more 
general reasoning, that Section 7 should not" apply to projects at an 
advanced stage of construction." (Pet. Br. 30). See gene rally, 
ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS, Ch. V (1973). 
3 1 E.g. Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett, 454 F.2d 613 
(CA. 3). 
32 E.g. EDF v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164, 1177 (CA. 6); Scherr v . Volpe, 
446 F.2d 1013, 1033 (CA. 7). 
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consideration of the environmental impact of all 
proposed agency action. [EDF v. TVA, 468 F.2d 
1161, 1177 (CA. 6).] 
The critical factor, in short, is the possibility of 
meaningful application of the statute. Cases illustrating 
this approach (rej ecting as irrelevant the fact that 
decisions to proceed with a project were made prior to 
NEPA) are so numerous that the issue can oe viewed as 
settled .33 
The only qualification that courts have suggested is in 
cases where compliance with the statute could not 
possibly affect the decision to complete. Thus, in Arlington 
Coalition on Transportation v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323 (CA. 4), 
cert. denied sub nom. Fugate v. Arlington Coalition on 
Transportation, 409 U.S . 1000 (1973), the court applied 
NEPA to a project that was long underway . The court 
noted, however, in language cited by TVA, that: 
At some stage of progress , the costs of altering or 
abandoning the project could so definitely 
outweigh whatever benefits might accrue therefrom 
33 Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885 (CA. 1) (urban redevelopment 
project: seven years in planning, some sites cleared prior to NEPA, 
approximately two-thirds of project appropriations spent or 
encumbered); Arlington Coalition on Tran sportation v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 
1323 (CA. 4) (highway: ten years in planning and design, 84% of right 
of way purchased for $28 million); Named Individual Members of San 
Antonio Conservation Society v. Texas Highway Department , 446 F.2d 
1013 (CA. 5) (highway: seven years in planning and design, funds 
authorized); EDF v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164 (CA. 6) (Tellico project: 
two-thirds of property purchased, one-fourth of roads relocated, 
construction begun on all major components, $29 million spent); Sch err 
v. Volp e, 466 F.2d 1027 (CA. 7) (road widening: contracts let, 
construction begun); Environmental Defense Fund , Inc. v. Corps of 
Engineers of th e United States Army, 470 F.2d 289 (CA. 8) (f1o?d control 
project: two-thirds complete when NEPA enacted, $10 mIllIOn. spent; 
Corps held to good faith compliance) ; Keith v. Cailfor11la Highway 
Commission, 352 F. Supp. 1324 (CD. Cal.) affd 506 F .2d 696 (CA. 9) 
(highway: 55% of right of way acquired, $88 million spent). 
I 
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that it might no longer be "possible" to change the 
project in accordance with [NEPA's] Section 102. 
[458 F .2d at 1331.] 
If NEPA's impact statement procedures can have no 
"possible" or meaningful effect, the project may continue 
without a §102 statement. 34 Doubts whether that stage has 
been reached, however, "must be resolved in favor of 
applicability." (Id.) 
34 None of the implied exemption standards, it should be noted, 
turns on percentage tests. It is the foreclosure of meaningful project 
choice that is relevant, not the mere fact that some percentage of 
project funds are spent. Supra, note 33. Here, TVA had spent only 
$35 million of the expected total of $120 million when the threat to the 
species was discovered, and the vast majority of project expenditure 
had been for the purchase of valuable land and for road and bridge 
improvements (sup ra, 13). The project was hardly, as petitioner alleges, 
"substantially completed" (Pet. Br. 21) or "more than 50% complete" 
(Pet. Br. 19). 
The NEPA cases cited by TVA are not inconsistent with this rule of 
meaningful applicability. I£ Ragland v. Mueller, 460 F.2d 1196 (CA. 5), 
\ 
there was no modification possible. On t he Act's effective date, 16 of 
20 miles of highway were complete and NEPA's decision making 
procedure could have had no meaningful effect. The court in Pizitz, Inc. 
v. Volpe, _ F. Supp. _, 2 ELR 20378 (M.D. Ala.) , afi'd 467 F. 2d 
208 (CA. 5), had no need to discuss the applicability of NEPA . An 
impact statement had already been prepared, distributed , and 
approved before construction was begun. 
In Greene County Planning Board v. Federa l Power Commission, 455 
F.2d 412 (CA . 2), the construction of two power lines was allowed to 
proceed not based upon the degree of completion, but primarily 
because there had been no "obstinate refusal to comply with NEPA," 
plaintiffs had waited too long to raise objections, and there was no 
"significant potential for subversion of the substantive policies 
expressed in NEPA," unlike the proceedings for a third power line 
which the court did enjOin. 455 F.2d at 425. 
The two cases previously arising under the Endangered Species Act 
are similarly consistent with this rule. Construction was enjOined in 
Na tional Wildlife Federa tion v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359 (CA. 5) , though 
the highway project had been in progress for years. An injunction was 
denied in Sierra Club v. Fro ehlke, 534 F.2d 1289 (CA. 8), because the 
plaintiffs did not demonstrate that the listed species was threatened by 
the construction. 
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This pragmatic exception does not apply in this case for 
two reasons. First, as the ongoing Congressional review 
indicates, there are development alternatives available 
even at present, allegations to the contrary not-
withstanding.35 There is, moreover, considerable doubt 
that the "benefits" to be obtained by impoundment 
outweigh the benefits of other alternatives. The recently 
submitted GAO report on the Tellico project concluded 
that valuable development options not involving 
impoundment presently exist for the project. The study 
found that the public value of a river-based development 
project (capitalizing upon the valley's agricultural, 
recreational, industrial and tourism potential)36 may be 
several times greater than the $3.7 million in yearly 
benefits claimed for the impoundment. TVA itself has 
noted that the unflooded valley could yield up to $6.4 
mill ion per year in agricultural revenues alone if its prime 
farmlands were developed, and other observers have 
made higher estimates. 37 It should be evident from the 
existence of alternatives today that TVA had such 
alternatives available in 1973, when the threat to the 
endangered species became known and the Act became 
law. At the present time, with the Tellico case before 
35 There is a statement in the District Court's opinion that " there 
are no alternatives to impoundment of the reservoir, short of scrapping 
the entire project." [419 F. Supp . at 758.) This statement is not 
presented as a finding of fact. Indeed , the court was not reque~ted to 
make such a finding and no evidence was presented. It IS not 
supported in the record and does not bind this Court. Interstate 0 rCUlt , 
Inc. v. United States, 304 U.s. 55; United States ex rei. Paxos v. Rundle, 
491 F.2d 447 (CA. 3). See supra , 14, at note 18. 
36 GAO REPORT, supra at 21-27. 
37 GAO REPORT, supra at 26 . 
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Congress, this Court should not presume that Congress 
will not select one of these alternatives rather than permit 
im poundmen t. 38 
Second, the purposes of the Endangered Species Act are 
even more clearly frustrated than in the case of NEPA, if 
completion decisions are made without attention to the 
Act's requirements. NEPA is basically procedural. A 
project very near completion is unlikely to be affected by 
adding a new p rocedural requirement on top of the prior 
decision-making process . The Endangered Species Act, in 
contrast, embodies the express substantive command that 
federal agencies may not act so as to jeopardize the 
continued existence of endangered species. It can 
meaningfully be applied - and must be - even if a 
project is nearing completion. 3 9 The Act is not primarily 
38 The principle of "legislative remand" would have coutts leave to 
Congress the obligation of declaring its true intent. "[T]he role of 
courts is not to make public policy, but to help assure that public 
policy is made by the appropriate entity." SAX, DEFENDING THE 
ENVIRONMENT 149, Ch. 6 (1970) . 
39 It must be noted that TVA's argument is not limited to projects 
initiated prior to the Act's effective date. TVA's reasoning would 
exempt any project underway before an endangered species was 
discovered . The Court of Appeals refused to undermine the Act by 
opening so large a loophole: 
The complexity of the ecological sciences suggests that the 
detrimental impact of a project upon an endangered species 
may not always be clearly perceived before construction is well 
I underway .... For Congress or the Secretary of Interior to be able to make meaningful decisions. in furtherance of the purposes of the Act, the opportumty to choose must be preserved. Once a living species has been eradicated , 
discretion loses its significance . .. [W]ere . we to deem the 
extent of project completion relevant in determining the 
coverage of the Act, we would effectively defeat responsible 
eview in those cases in which the alternatives are most 
harply drawn and the required analysis the most complex . 
t his expedient strategy would frustrate effective enforcement 
~f the Act and hinder efforts to prevent the wanton destruction 
of vulnerable species. (549 F.2d at 1071, A. 88-89). 
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concerned with procedure nor limited in scope to 
decision-making. It is possible for TVA to avoid the 
eradication of the snail darter, and the clear language of 
the Act requires that it do so. 
[A]ny judicial error in a NEPA case is subject to 
later review and remedial reversal before 
permanent damage is done to the environment. 
The same cannot be said for an erroneously 
granted exemption from the Endangered Species 
Act. If we were to err on the side of permissiveness 
here, and allow TVA to complete and close the dam 
as scheduled, the most eloquent argument would 
be of little consequence to an extinct species. [549 
F.2d at 1072, A. 91.] 
Petitioner, in consultation with the Secretary, is 
obligated . to modify its existing economic development 
plan for the valley area, in order to effectuate both the 
development and conservation purposes of Congress. Any 
other resolution would permit TVA to evade compliance 
with the Act. As the Court of Appeals concluded: 
\ Our responsibility under [the Act] is merely to preserve the status quo where endangered species are threatened, thereby guaranteeing the legislative and executive branches sufficient opportunity to grapple with the alternatives. [549 F.2d 1071, A. 
89.]40 
40 The district court took the same position on its judicial role 
where violations of federal law are found . "Balancing such interests is a 
legislative and not a judicial function. " A 46. In light of the diverse 
Congressional objectives involved in this case and the vanety .of 
economic, social and environmental issues that it turns on, the dlstnct 
court properly declined to take on such a legislative decision. The 
judge accordingly based his refusal to enforce the Act on his opinion 
that it did not apply to the case. Courts sitting in equity hav~ broad 
powers to shape remedies to effectuate Congress' statutory obJectl:res, 
and injunctive relief is required as and where necessary to achIeve 
compliance with federal law . Hecht Co. v . Bowles, 321 U.s. 321, 328-329; 
(continued on next page) 
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In short, neither the facts, the case law, nor Congress' 
policies, actions, and statutory language justify the 
allegation that the dam component of the Tellico Project 
was impliedly exempted from Section 7 of the Act. 
II 
SECTION 7 HAS NOT BEEN IMPLIEDLY AMENDED BY 
CONTINUED APPROPRIA nONS FOR THE TELLICO PROJECT 
Petitioner admits that "courts ordinarily should not 
infer from appropriations acts an intent by Congress to 
repeal or modify substantive law" . (Pet. Br., 39). 
Petitioner also admits that this "doctrine disfavoring 
repeals by implication 'applies with full vigor . . . when 
the subsequent legislation is an appropriations 
measure.' " 
[Id., citing Committee for Nuclear Responsibility , Inc. v. 
Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 785 (C.A.D.C.).] Petitioner even 
acknowledges that it is building its argument primarily on 
the "committee reports recommending the legislation," 
rather than on the appropriations acts themselves. (Pet . 
Br., 36-7.) Despite these basic defects in its position, 
petitioner asks this Court to find that Congress in the 
"particular and unusual circumstances of this case" has 
impliedly amended Section 7 to exempt the impoundment 
portion of the Tellico Project. Petitioner's burden is a 
heavy one. 
(continued from preceding page) 
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49,59 and 60. Where a law is 
violated, the equitable power of the court /J~ust. be exercised in light 
of the large objectives of the Act," He cht, 321 U.S. at 330, 331, through 
" the principled application of standards consistent with these 
purposes. " Albemarle Paper Co. v . Moody, 422 U.S. 405 , 417. The Court 
of Appeals cited Hecht in holding that, a violation of Congress' 
mandate being shown, petitioner must comply with federal law. A. 95, 
89-90. See also, Hearings on Endangered Species Oversight, before a 
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and 
Fisheries 94th Cong., 1s t. Sess. 97-98 (1975). 
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This Court for mor", than 130 years has held to a 
presumption against implying amendments to Acts of 
Congress. Wood v . United States, 41 U .S. 343, 362. The 
Court echoes the words of Mr. Justice Story in that 1842 
decision by continuing to hold that where two statutes are 
capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts , 
absent a clearly expressed congressional~
to the contrary, to regard each as effective . . . A 
new statute will not be read as wholly or even 
partially amending a prior one unless there exists a 
'positive repugnancy' between the provisions of 
the new and those of the old that cannot be 
reconciled. 1 
Because this standard derives from the principle of 
separation of governmental powers, the Court has said it 
will honor both statutes "unless a 'clear intention 
otherwise' can be discerned . .. " . Radzanower v. Touche 
Ross & Co., 426 U.s . 148, 154. Even assuming that 
legislative history were as authoritative as a statute, there 
is no evidence of CongreSSional intention to amend 
Section 7. 
1 Regional Railroad Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.s. 102, 134 
quoting the Special Court in that case , 384 F. Supp. 895, 943, and 
Morton v . Mancari , 417 U.s. 535, 551. Petitioner attempts to aVOId thIS 
rule by arguing that the appropriations act is " specific" to Tellico , 
while the Endangered Species Act is " general" . Quite to the contrary , 
TVA appropriations are made in a single undifferentiated lump sum 
yearly grant for all agency expenditure s, and the 1977 provision . on 
endangered species program funding was shared WIth other agenCIes. 
Moreove r, if a semantic argument is to be made, Section 7 is " specific" 
in its prohibition of jeopardy to a species arising from fed eral 
destruction of its critical habitat. Petitioners distinction seems to be 
specious as well as unhelpful. 
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The provisions of the appropriations acts and the 
Endangered Species Act are not repugnant. These 
conclusions are supported by the presently continuing 
Congressional review of the Tellico project. 
A. SUBSEQUENT APPROPRIATIONS ACTS CONTA IN 
NO EXPRESSION OF INTENTION TO AMEND SEC-
TION 7. 
Petitioner urges an implied amendment based upon a 
"mere appropriations law" Minis v . United States, 40 U .S. 
423, 445, and such alleged amendments are particularly 
suspect. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v . 
Seaborg, supra, 463 F.2d at 785. 
Judicial reluctance to find implied amendments by 
appropriations acts reflects a recognition of the functional 
separation between appropriations committees and the 
substantive lawmaking committees, embodied in the 
legislative rules of both chambers. House Rule XXI sets 
formal requirements for appropriations bills, including the 
clause: "Nor shall any provision in any such bill or 
amendment thereto changing existing law be in 
order. . . . " Senate Rule XVI is to similar effect. 2 In light 
of the rules, the differing nature of appropriations acts 
and substantive laws, and the separation of powers 
between Court and Congress, many courts have Simply 
declined to permit appropriations acts to alter existing 
law. 3 
The application of that principle to this case is 
particularly compell ing. The 1973 act was drafted and 
reported to Congress by the Subcommittee on the 
2 Rule XXI (2), Manual of the House of Representatives; Rule XVI 
(4), Standing Rules of the Senate. 
; fOF v. Froehlke, 473 F,2d 346, 355 (CA. 8); O.c. Federation v. 
Airis, 391 F.2d 478, 482 (CA.D.C); fOF v. TVA, 468 F,2d 1164, 1182 
(CA. 6); National Audubon Society v. Andrus, (No. 76-0943 Dec. 9, 1977, 
D.CD.C, (11 ERC 1057, 1060)); Atchison, Topeka & 5al1 Francisco Rlf. v . 
Callm('lllj , 382 F. Supp. 620 (D.CD.C). . 
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Environment of the Senate Commerce Committee, and the 
Fisheries and Wildlife Subcommittee of the House 
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee. These same 
committees were responsible for the Endangered Species 
Act Amendments in 1976. These committees have also 
held oversight hearings and hearings on amendments to 
the Act. They have thus developed substantial expertise in 
the administration and purposes of the Act. The public 
works subcommittees of the House and Senate 
appropriations committees, by contrast, have no expertise 
with the Act. Their familiarity with the endangered 
species issue has been largely limited to the testimony of 
petitioner concurrent with its funding requests, with no 
other information on biological conditions or economic 
alternatives, and no notice of the ongoing GAO and 
Hanson Studies .4 The appropriations committees' central 
function is to distribute money to the programs and 
agencies created through the substantive legislative 
process. To permit the appropriations activities of these 
committees to amend substantive statutes is to invite 
them to second guess the legislative committees which 
possess the statutory expertise, background, and 
substantive jurisdiction. As Senator Kennedy, a sponsor 
of the 1976 amendments to the Act said, in debate on 
those amendments: 
Any legislation which amends the Endangered 
Species Act ... must be carefully drawn to assu.-re 
that the Congress' commitment to the protection of 
endangered animals is not diminished. The 
amendment we approve today has been under 
4 In this light the Senate appropriation committee report's comment 
that the committee had been fully informed and had carefully reviewed 
the cas~ (S. Rep. No. 95-301, 95th Cong ., 1st Sess. 98-99 (1977)) must be 
considered to reflect that the committee had fully reviewed TVA's ca se 
for continued project funding, not that it had reviewed the endangered 
species consultations in all their complexity. 
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considel<ltion for a year and a half, has been the 
subject of public hearings, and has had the ... 
input of ... animal protection groups. As a result, 
we were able to draft this amendment to the 
Endangered Species Act which reaffirmed and 
strengthened the resolve of the Congress to protect 
[the species there threatened] the whale. [122 
Congr. Rec. S 10367 (June 24, 1976).] 
Although it is true that the public works subcommittees 
of the Congressional appropriations committees continued 
funding for the Tell ico project, various references to the 
project in the legislative history fall far short of an intent 
to amend the 1973 Act. Petitioner's strongest evidence for 
an implied amendment is the 1977 appropriations act, 
which does not show any such intent. The act did not 
refer to Tellico, and provided: 
That not to exceed $2,000,000 of this appropriation 
is available to carry out the purposes of the 
Endangered Species Act of 1973 .. . including 
cooperative efforts as contemplated by that Act to 
relocate endangered or threatened species to other 
suitable habitats as may be necessary to expedite 
project construction. 5 
The provision is beneficial, granting an additional sum to 
TVA to carry out the purposes of the Act including 
transplantation experiments. The text of this 
appropriations act, however, does not purport to amend 
the Act as to Tellico. The identical provision, for example, 
also appears in other agencies' grants . 6 Rather, the clause 
reflects the appropriation committees' belief that 
transplantation experiments would successfully resolve 
PL. 95-96, 91 Stat. 808 (1977). 
" Id, 91 Stat. 799, 802. 
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project/species conflicts, as they had been told. Far from 
changing the Endangered Species Act, the 1977 
appropriations clause expresses positive support for the 
Act's purposes. 
The 1977 appropriations act, moreover, was 
accompanied by committee reports that make explicitly 
clear that the funding was not intended to amend the law: 
This Committee has not viewed the Endangered 
Species Act as preventing the completion and use 
of these projects which were well underway at the 
time the affected species were listed as 
endangered. If the Act has such an effect ., . 
legislation should be enacted to allow these projects 
to be completed ... . /1 [H.R. Rep. No. 95-379, 95th 
Cong ., 1st Sess. 104 (1977), (emphasis added).] 
The 1977 reports reflect the committees' intention to 
continue funding for the project, their confidence in 
transplantation attempts 7 and their opinion that the Act 
was of limited application to ongoing projects . As Senator 
Stennis acknowledged in the hearings, this appropriations 
bill was not the proper forum to exempt Tellico from the 
Act, and any attempt to do so would be met with a point 
of order. 8 
7 TVA also had reported that it had petitioned Interior to delist the 
Little Tennessee as critical habitat, because 1975 earth dike construction 
in the river's North channel had blocked the return of downstream 
juveniles to their spawning habitat. Interior rejected the petition on its 
biological facts and persuaded petitioner to transfer the fish around the 
obstacle. See suprn, 21, at note 36. 
8 Hearings on Public Works for Water and Power Development and 
Energy Research Appropriations Bill, 1978, before a subcommittee of 
the Senate Committee on Commerce, 95th Cong ., 1st Sess. Part 5, 347 
(1977). Congressman Bevill added a further note on the floor that the 
committee distrusted citizen enforcement of the Act, and that "[w]e 
are confident that the endangered species can be sufficiently 
protected through relocations and other efforts." [123 Congo Rec. H 
5760-H5766 (daily ed., June 13, 1977).] There was no debate of the issue 
on the floor of the House , nor was it mentioned in the Senate. 
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The statements in the 1975 and 1976 appropriation 
committee reports also fall far short of establishing a 
Congressional intention impliedly to amend the 
Endangered Species Act . The 1975 hearings and 
committee reports (see Pet. Br., 7-8) took place many 
months before the snail darter was even listed as an 
endangered species . At the time of consideration by the 
appropriations committees, Section 7 did not present a 
barrier to closure of the dam at Tellico. The 1976 
appropriations hearings took place after the district court's 
decision in this case. The Senate committee directed the 
completion of the Tellico project on the strength of that 
decision . (Pet. Br., 8-11) . The committee reports for these 
two years reflect the committees' opinion on the changing 
legal status of the impoundment portion of the Tellico 
project. They do not, however, indicate any intent to alter 
the Endangered Species Act. 9 
B. THE PROVISIONS OF THE APPROPRIATIONS ACTS 
ARE NOT INCONSISTENT WITH SECTION 7. 
None of the appropriations acts contains any reference 
to the Tellico project . The only language which refers at all 
to the Endangered Species Act, found in the 1977 
appropria tions act, is actually supportive of the 
applicability of Section 7 to the Tellico project, as noted 
at p. 49 , supra . It does not seem reasonable to suggest that 
appropriating funds to permit Section 7 compliance is 
evidence of irr econcilability. In the absence of 
inconsistency between these statutes, the appropriations 
acts may not be read as impliedly amending the 1973 Act. 
See Mercanti le National Ba nk v. Langdeau, 371 U.S . 
" See also, Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 504-508; Ex Pade Endo, 
323 U.s . 283, 303 n . 24; Airis, supra, at 391 F. 2d 478, 481 -482 
(CA.D.C). Such knowledge and intention is of course the basic 
requirement for a finding of implied changes of substantive law. 
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555, 565-6; Posadas v. Nationa l City Bank, 296 U.s. 497, 
503 . 
Petitioner asserts, however, that notwithstanding the 
lack of any amending language, the purpose of 
appropriations is necessarily inconsistent with Section 7 
because the project as planned would jeopardize the 
species . This proposition neglects TVA's own assurances 
to the appropriations committees that it was doing its best 
to preserve the snail darter, (Pet . Br., 8-10, 14-16), and 
that transplantation of the fish seemed likely to succeed 
(Pet. Br., 14). In light of TVA's statements, it would not 
be inconsistent for the appropriations committees to 
continue funding the project, believing that compliance 
with the Endangered Species Act was achievable, as it is. 
Furthermore, petitioner's argument would have 
far-reaching and potentially disastrous consequences for 
regulatory legislation in general. Petitioner urges, in 
effect, that court challenges to wage and hour laws, civil 
rights requirements, contracting standards, and other 
regulatory schemes could be defeated by continued 
Congressional appropriations for projects contravening 
these acts . This proposition puts an unreasonable burden 
on Congress and particularly on the appropriations 
committees, and has been rejected by prior case law. 
"Congress must be free to provide ... appropriations .. . 
even though claims of illegality . .. are pending in the 
courts. There is, of course, nothing inconsistent with 
adoption of appropriations ... measures on the pro tanto 
a?sumption of validity, while leaving anyc la1tn of' 
invalidity to be determined by the courts." Seaborg, supra, 
463 F .2d at 785. 10 "If the separation of powers doctrine is 
10 A long series of NEPA cases support this stand. Appropriations 
have been continually provided for pro jects undergoing NEPA 
litigation, yet respondents are not aware of any case where a mere 
appropriations bill has been held to exempt a project from the duty to 
comply with NEPA. EDF v. Frochlkc, 473 F.2d 346, 350 (CA. 8); EDF v. 
TVA, 468 F.2d 1164, 1182 (CA . 6); EDF v . C01VS, 492 F.2d 1123 (CA. 5); 
Scahorg, su pra , 463 F.2d at 785 (CA.D.C). 
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to retain its vitality," the Sixth Circuit wrote, "Congress 
must be free to appropriate funds for public works 
projects with the expectation that resulting executive 
action will pass judicial muster." [A. 92] 
C. PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT FOR IMPLIED AMEND-
MENT EXTENDS FAR BEYOND EVEN THE MOST EX-
CEPTIONAL PRIOR CASE LAW. 
Petitioner puts great reliance upon U.S. v. Dickerson, 
310 U.S. 554, and Friends of the Earth v. Armstrong, 485 
F.2d 1 (CA. 10), but as the Secretary of Interior notes in 
his dissenting brief, petitioner is asking the court to go 
far beyond those exceptional cases. 
We do not contend, nor do we understand the 
court of appeals to hold, that express words of 
exemption must appear on the face of the 
appropriations statute. Nor do we understand the 
court of appeals to hold that repeals must be 
enacted by specific reference to the statute from 
which exemption is sought. However, we have 
found no case in which a repeal or exemption was 
held to flow from a statute which is silent on the 
subject matter. To the extent that any general rule 
can be derived from cases involving argued 
exemptions from substantive requirements of other 
law, it is that implied exemption by appropriation 
is strongly disfavored and will only be held to 
occur when the statute itself, together with its 
legislative history, manifests a consciousness of the 
requested exemption and a clear intention to grant 
it. [Pet. Br., 8A-9A.] 
In Dickerson, this Court sustained the War Department's 
denial of reenlistment bonuses to soldiers who claimed 
under a 1922 statute, because the 1938 appropriations act 
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there had specifically provided that no such bonuses 
should be paid "notwithstanding the applicable portions 
of [the 1922 Act]." 310 U.S . at 555 . In addition to the clear 
statutory language, Dickerson's legislative history revealed 
a full and specific discussion of the act's repealing effect. 11 
The re-enlistment bonuses were the only part of the 1922 
act that had not been expressly repealed, and in 
Depression circumstances, despite a vigorous effort to 
save the bonuses, Congress decided that the nation did 
not have enough money to pay for them . After forceful 
debate, the bill was passed with the amending provision 
which, though contrary to the rules of both the House and 
Senate, was not subject to a point of order because it was 
inserted only in the conference version. 12 
Dickerson, which stretched the implied amendment 
concept to its extreme, still falls far short of the present 
case. Dickerson involved the express withholding of funds 
I I The same provision was inserted in various appropriations bills 
for eight successive years. Apparently the reason Congress did not 
repeal the previous act expressly was a desire to recommence paying 
the bonuses as soon as the country could afford to. 
12 Congress had clear and specific knowledge of the effect of the 
appropriations bill on the Economy Act. Immediately before the full 
House voted on the bill, they were told by Congressman Izaac that 
they were legislating by subterfuge. [83 Congo Rec. 8679 (June 16, 
1938). ] 
The statutes in Dickerso ll were necessarily repugnant and 
inconsistent. Where the first statute authorizes the payment of 
bonuses, the second statute states that these bonuses should not be 
paid, notwithstanding the first statute. This is the kind of repugnancy 
between provisions of two statutes that this court has required before 
finding a repeal by implication. Even where the provisions of the two 
statutes were so necessarily irreconcilable, that Court went into the 
legislative history to insure that Congress fully intended to suspend the 
substantive effects of the previous bill. Absent any language in an 
appropriations bill which is not inconsistent , let alone not repugnant 
with a previous statute , a court has never found a repeal by 
implication. 
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authorized by a prior statute .13 This was a funding 
decision applicable to a single year, to be reconsidered 
and relegislated each year thereafter. TVA's argument is 
based on a statute and record that are silent on 
Congressional intent to amend . Further, the impact of the 
amendment that TVA urges will render a species extinct. 
There would be no opportunity for reconsideration. 
Friends of the Earth v . Armstrong, supra, does not go 
even as far as Dickerson . The issue in Armstrong was 
whether the waters of Lake Powell would be kept out of 
Rainbow Bridge National Monument, as required by a 
1956 Act, by construction of a coffer dam at the edge of 
the Monument. Subsequent substantive statutes, as well 
as appropriation acts, retreated from this requirement. 
(Colorado River Basin Act of 1968, 43 U.s.c. §§1501, 
1521(a).) The hearings and debates on the appropriations 
bills showed extensive Congressional review of the 
question. Since twelve successive bills provided that "no 
part of the funds herein appropriated shall be available for 
construction or operation of facilities to prevent waters of 
Lake Powell from entering any National Monument," and 
unambiguous legislative history demonstrated that 
Congress fully intended the amendment, the court held 
that the requirement of the 1956 Act was suspended for 
1973. The court noted: 
This is not really a situation of repeal by 
implication ... but more a reversal of a previous 
position after considering it fully in the public 
13 The same circumstance distinguishes City of Los Angeles v. 
Adams, 556 F.2d 40 (C.A.D.C.), where an authorization for 
appropriations for the Los Angeles airport was specifically reduced by 
a limitation in subsequent appropriations, after protracted 
Congressional discussions extending over several years. Cf. New York 
Airways, Inc. v. United States, 369 F.2d 743 (1966), where a specific 
reduction of appropriations was held not to limit the airway's rights. 
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hearings and after members apparently came to the 
conclusion that the protective works would be 
more detrimen tal than the presence of water in the 
monument. [485 F .2d at 9.] 
In brief, 
. . . [R]eliance upon Friends of the Earth v. Armstrong 
... is misplaced. There, congressional intent was 
quite explicit both on the face of the facts in 
question and in the accompanying legislative 
history . Similarly, in United States v. Dickerson . . . 
congressional intent was manifestly clear from both 
the language of the Act and the legislative history . 
[Sierra Club v . Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610, 638 (N.D . 
Cal.)] 
The cases cited by petitioner are narrow, exceptional 
extensions of the traditional rule against implied 
amendments by appropriation. On the facts of the present 
case, petitioner's argument would require far greater 
departures from established principles if petitioner is to 
persuade this Court that such an amendment should be 
found. 
The case law, in other words, is overwhelmingly 
aligned against the judicial extension requested by 
petitioner. There have indeed been some cases over the 
years where actions less than repeals of substantive law 
have been allowed to define implied amendments. In 
cases where parts of the executive branch sought to 
expand their authority through broad construction, 
appropriations have sometimes been permitted to ratify 
their claims. 14 More recently, however, even implied 
ra tifica tion has generally been rej ected by the courts . 15 
I.J Fleming v. Moi1ni( ,k. 331 U.s. 111; Brooks v. Dn('n r. 313 U.s . 354. 
I, Cases cited supra, 48, at note 3. 
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The argument here goes beyond mere ratification or 
extension of authority by appropriation, however, to an 
attempt to override a substantive Congressional statute. 
No case has been found where such repeal of a direct 
Congressional prohibition has been allowed, absent the 
~estric~ive statutory language and clear expressions of 
mtentIOn which existed in the exceptional Armstrong and 
Dickerson cases. 
D. PETITIONER SHOULD SEEK ITS LEGISLATIVE RE-
MEDY DIRECTLY IN THE LAW-MAKING COMMIT-
TEES WHERE THE ISSUE NOW LIES, RATHER THAN 
BY SEEKING TO PERSUADE THIS COURT TO FASH-
ION AN IMPLIED AMENDMENT FROM APPROPRIA-
TIONS. 
The Tellico case has been undergOing intensive 
Congressional review in the committees that properly 
exercise jurisdiction over the Act. Hearings were held in 
1975, 1976, and 1977. 16 In 1975 and 1976 those hearings 
extensively reviewed the implementation of the Act, 
administrative problems encountered, and proposed 
amendments. Petitioner, however, did not attend or 
attempt to raise the Section 7 issue in these substantive 
hearings, instead restricting its comments and testimony 
to the funding forum of the appropriations committees. In 
1977 the House committee initiated the GAO Tellico study 
and the University of Tennessee's Hanson Study on 
Tellico alternatives, exemption bills were introduced, the 
Senate resource protection subcommittee held extensive 
oversight hearings with a focus on Tellico, and further 
hearings in both House and Senate were scheduled for 
this seSSIon. 
16 H ea rings on Endangered Species Oversight, befo re a 
Subcommittee of the Ho use Committee on Merchant Marine and 
Fisheries, 94th Cong., 1st Sess . (1975), and Hearings cited sup /"n, 19, 20, 
at notes 30,33. 
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Tellico and the Act in other words, have been and are 
now receiving extensive Congressional consideration on 
their merits in the committees that have substantive 
jurisdiction over the matter, and those committees clearly 
do not believe that the Tellico case has been pre-empted 
from their jurisdiction by the appropriations process. 
It is in those committees that petitioner should now 
make its case for an amendment to Section 7, continuing 
its arguments made in the 1977 Culver Hearings, that it 
was now too late to reconsider the Tellico impoundment, 
that the remaining costs and benefits support the project, 
and that it need not consider project modifications that 
would protect the endangered species in the critical 
habitat. Respondents, supported by the recommendations 
of the GAO Report and the Hanson Study, will continue 
to suggest the development of constructive economic 
options for the project which capitalize upon the valley'S 
valuable and unique assets, instead of the impoundment 
of one last reservoir. Petitioner's argument, which would 
forestall that Congressional review, requests this Court to 
extend disfavored theories farther than ever before, on a 
record that does not support them. To indulge those 
arguments would be neither necessary nor proper. 
It is the political process, not the appellate court system, 
that should review and decide the complex questions of 
Congressional policy, economic cost accounting, agency 
responsibility, and the public interest here involved. 
60 
CONCLUSION 
This action was brought to compel petitioner to comply 
with Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act. The 
litigation to date has preserved the species, while 
generating Congressional and inter-agency ciscussion of 
constructive project development alternatives. The Court 
should permit this review to continue by affirming the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
March I, 1978 
Respectfully submitted, 
Zygmunt J. B. Plater 
W. P. Boone Dougherty 
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